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When studying the neural mechanisms
underlying conscious perception we
should be careful not to misinterpret evi-
dence, and delineate these mechanisms
from activity which could reflect the pre-
requisites or consequences of conscious
experiences (Aru et al., 2012; De Graaf
et al., 2012). However, at the same time,
we need to be careful not to exclude any
relevant evidence about the phenomenon.
Recently, novel paradigms have
attempted to dissociate activity related to
conscious perception from activity reflect-
ing its prerequisites and consequences. In
particular, one of these studies focused on
resolving the role of frontal lobe in con-
scious perception (Frässle et al., 2014).
Through a clever experimental design that
contrasted blood-oxygen-level-dependent
(BOLD) activity elicited during binocu-
lar rivalry with and without behavioral
reports, Frässle et al. (2014) suggested
that frontal lobe, or a large part of it,
may not be necessary for conscious per-
ception per se. Rather frontal areas are
involved in processing the consequences
of conscious perception like monitoring
the perceptual content in order to elicit
the appropriate report of the subjective
experience. In particular, Frässle et al.
showed that behavioral reports of con-
scious experiences resulted in increased
and more widespread activity of the
frontal lobe compared to a condition
without behavioral reports, where spon-
taneous transitions in the content of
consciousness were estimated through
the objective measures like optokinetic
nystagmus (OKN) and pupil dilation.
The authors of this study concluded that
“frontal areas are associated with active
report and introspection rather than with
rivalry per se.” Therefore, activity in pre-
frontal regions could be considered as a
consequence rather than a direct neural
correlate of conscious experience.
However, a previous study
(Panagiotaropoulos et al., 2012) that
measured directly neural activity in the
macaque lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC)
using extracellular electrophysiological
recordings could help to narrow down the
role of frontal activity in conscious percep-
tion and exclude the contribution of cog-
nitive or motor consequences in prefrontal
neural activity during visual awareness.
Specifically, the activity of feature selec-
tive neurons in the macaque LFPC was
shown to be modulated in accordance
with the content of subjective perception,
without any confound from motor action
(i.e., behavioral reports). Using binocular
flash suppression (BFS), a paradigm of
robust, externally induced perceptual sup-
pression and without any requirement of
behavioral reports, neurons in the LPFC
were found to increase or decrease their
discharge activity when their preferred
stimulus was perceptually dominant or
suppressed, respectively. Therefore, since
neuronal discharges in the LPFC follow
the content of conscious perception even
without any motor action, the conclusion
of Frässle et al. (2014) about the role of
frontal lobe activity in rivalrous percep-
tion needs to be refined. Prefrontal activity
can indeed reflect the content of conscious
perception under conditions of rivalrous
stimulation and this activity should not
be necessarily considered as the result of a
motor action or self-monitoring required
for active report. Moreover, the results
obtained by Frässle et al. (2014) do not
anatomically preclude the entire prefrontal
cortex from having a role in conscious
perception. Specifically, the BOLD activity
related to rivalry in their experiment is still
present in the right inferior frontal lobe
and right superior frontal lobe (Zaretskaya
and Narinyan, 2014). Further, activation
of dorso- LPFC in conscious perception
of Mooney images was also reported in a
study that explicitly controlled for activity
elicited by motor action (Imamoglu et al.,
2012).
It is true that the BFS-related pre-
frontal activity cannot conclude on a
mechanistic, causal involvement of pre-
frontal activity in driving spontaneous
transitions in conscious perception. This
is because BFS is a paradigm of exter-
nally induced perceptual suppression and
is therefore not directly informative about
the role of recorded activity in sponta-
neous transitions. Therefore, the possibil-
ity remains open that the kind of pre-
frontal activity observed in the macaque
LPFC during BFS is not a causal factor
for conscious perception but rather reflects
some other aspects of monitoring that
are not directly related to motor action.
For example, prefrontal activity could just
reflect a read-out from other areas like
the inferior temporal cortex (Sheinberg
and Logothetis, 1997) that also reliably
reflects the content of conscious percep-
tion. However, if this is the case, it trig-
gers the question why this activity that
closely follows the content of subjective
perception is observed in the LPFC even
in the absence of any behavioral report.
Overall, it motivates further investigation
to understand whether prefrontal activity
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has amechanistic role in conscious percep-
tion or it might underlie some monitoring
functions that are not necessarily bound to
motor action.
Similar to this debate on the role of
LPFC in visual awareness, the last decade
witnessed disagreement on whether
activity in primary visual cortex reflects
subjective perception as monitored with
electrophysiology and fMRI (Leopold
and Logothetis, 1996; Tong, 2003; Maier
et al., 2008; Keliris et al., 2010; Leopold,
2012). Measuring both electrophysiolog-
ical activity and the BOLD signal in the
same macaques engaged in an identical
task of perceptual suppression finally pro-
vided the solution (Maier et al., 2008;
Leopold, 2012). Therefore, in order to
investigate and resolve the role of PFC in
visual perception, one must take a similar
approach that utilizes multiple measure-
ment techniques simultaneously or in the
same animal along with a careful exper-
imental design. The experimental tasks
should not only segregate the effect of
various cognitive processes such as atten-
tion or introspection in comparison to
awareness (Watanabe et al., 2011; Frässle
et al., 2014), but also use an objective cri-
terion to decode the content of conscious
experience (Frässle et al., 2014), therefore
separating perception-related activities
from the subsequent behavioral report.
Such an approach could therefore robustly
delineate the prerequisites and conse-
quences of conscious experience and reveal
the true correlates of conscious perception.
Lastly, although such a multimodal
approach could provide us substan-
tial insights into the activity underlying
the representation of conscious content,
whether or not this activity has a causal
role in mediating perception remains to
be understood. Although a number of
studies indeed point to a causal involve-
ment of prefrontal cortex in conscious
perception (reviewed in Dehaene and
Changeux, 2011), a systematic study which
directly interferes with prefrontal activ-
ity during a task of subjective perception
is currently, to the best of our knowl-
edge, missing. While utilizing objective
criteria as indicators of perceptual tran-
sitions, systematic perturbation of the
PFC (such as cooling, transcranial mag-
netic stimulation, microstimulation, or
optogenetics) and observing concomi-
tant changes in the temporal dynamics
of perceptual transitions could reveal its
causal contribution. Indeed, patients with
frontal lesions are impaired in their ability
to switch from one subjective view of an
ambiguous figure to the other (for exam-
ple see Ricci and Blundo, 1990, but also
see a different case study from Valle-Inclán
and Gallego, 2006).
We would like to conclude that in
formulating our conclusions related to
prerequisites, consequences and true cor-
relates of conscious experiences, we need
to have an integrative view on the available
evidence. Our investigations and con-
clusions about the neural correlates of
consciousness must not only entail better-
designed experiments but also diverse
experimental techniques (e.g., BOLD
fMRI, electrophysiology) that could mea-
sure brain activity on different spatial
and temporal scales (Panagiotaropoulos
et al., 2014). Such a multi-modal approach
holds great promise in refining our current
understanding of conscious processing.
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